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Abstract On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents’ reservation
values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency
with respect to Owen’s reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the
two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by
means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection
between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979).
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1 Introduction
The assignment game is a coalitional game that represents a two-sided market sit-
uation. In this market there exist a finite set of sellers, each one with an indivisible
object on sell, and a finite set of buyers willing to buy at most one object each. Each
agent has a reservation value that is what he or she obtains if not matched with an
agent on the opposite side. Every buyer-seller pair (i, j) is attached to a real number
ai j that represents the value that this pair can attain if matched together. From these
valuations, we obtain the assignment matrix A. The worth of each coalition is the
total profit that can be obtained by optimally matching buyers and sellers in the coali-
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tion. When reservation values are null and the assignment matrix is non-negative, our
game is the one introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Coalitional game theory analyzes how the agents can share the profit of an optimal
pairing, taking into account the worth of all possible coalitions. The most studied
solution concept in this model has been the core, the set of efficient allocations that
are coalitionally rational. Shapley and Shubik prove that the core of the assignment
game is non-empty and it can be described just in terms of the assignment matrix,
with no need of the associated characteristic function.
Other solutions have been considered for the assignment game: Thompson’s fair
division point (Thompson, 1981), the kernel or symmetrically pairwise bargained al-
locations (Rochford 1984), the nucleolus (Solymosi and Raghavan 1994), the Shap-
ley value (Hoffmann and Sudho¨lter, 2007; van den Brink and Pinte´r, 2012) and the
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels 2013). However, axiomatic
characterizations of solutions in this framework have been mainly focused on the core
(Sasaki, 1995; Toda, 2003 and 2005).
On the general class of coalitional games, the prenucleolus (that for the assign-
ment game coincides with the nucleolus) has been axiomatized by Sobolev (1975)
by means of covariance, anonimity and the reduced game property of Davis and
Maschler (1965). Potters (1991) also characterizes the nucleolus on the class of bal-
anced games1 by means of the above reduced game property. However, both afore-
mentioned sets of axioms do not characterize the nucleolus on the class of assignment
games since, for instance, the Davis and Maschler reduced game of an assignment
game needs not remain inside this class. Moreover, it seems desirable an axiomatiza-
tion of the nucleolus of the assignment game in terms of axioms that are not stated
by means of the characteristic function but by means of the data of the assignment
market.
In the present paper, on the domain of assignment games with agents’ reserva-
tion values, the nucleolus is uniquely determined by only two axioms: consistency
with respect to Owen’s reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the
two sides. Consistency is based on the derived game introduced by Owen (1992).
Roughly speaking, symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides only requires
that at each solution outcome of a market with as many buyers as sellers, the most
dissatisfied buyer has the same complaint as the most dissatisfied seller, where we in-
terpret the dissatisfaction of an agent with a given outcome as the difference between
his reservation value and the amount that this outcome allocates to him.
As a by-product of the axiomatization of the nucleolus, we obtain a geometric
characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical char-
acterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, show-
ing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bar-
gaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this
means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maxi-
mum amount that can be transferred, without getting outside the core, from one agent
to his/her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he/she can
receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core (Rochford 1984; Driessen
1 In fact Potters characterizes the nucleolus in a more general class of games.
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1999). We now state that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized
by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs
but also for optimally matched coalitions.
Preliminaries on assignment games are in Section 2. Section 3 explores the prop-
erty of consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game. In Section 4 we prove the
axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus and deduce a geometric characterization.
2 Preliminaries
Let U and U ′ be two countable disjoint sets, the first one formed by all potential
buyers and the second one formed by all potential sellers. An assignment market
with agents’ reservation values, hereafter an assignment market, is a quintuple γ =
(M,M′,A, p,q). The setsM ⊂U andM′ ⊂U ′ are two finite sets of buyers and sellers
respectively (the two sides of the market) of cardinality |M|= m and |M′|= m′, with
M∪M′ non-empty. Matrix A= (ai j)(i, j)∈M×M′ is such that for all (i, j) ∈M×M′, the
real number ai j denotes the worth obtained by the pair (i, j) if they trade. Finally,
p ∈ RM and q ∈ RM′ where, for all i ∈ M, pi is the reservation value of buyer i if
she remains unpaired with any seller (and similarly for q j for all j ∈M′). Notice that
neither ai j nor pi or q j are constrained to be non-negative. When the market has null
reservation prices we will just describe it as (M,M′,A).
A matching µ between S ⊆M and T ⊆M′ is a bijection from a subset of S to a
subset of T . We denote by Dom(µ) ⊆ S and Im(µ) ⊆ T the corresponding domain
and image. If i∈ S and j ∈ T are related by µ we indistinctly write (i, j) ∈ µ , j= µ(i)
or i= µ−1( j). We denote byM (S,T ) the set of matchings between S and T . Given
an assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), for all S ⊆M, T ⊆M′ and µ ∈M (S,T )
we write
v(S,T ;µ) = ∑
(i, j)∈µ
ai j+ ∑
i∈S\Dom(µ)
pi+ ∑
j∈T\Im(µ)
q j, (1)
with the convention that any summation over an empty set of indices is zero.
Amatching µ ∈M (M,M′) is optimal for the assignment market γ =(M,M′,A, p,q)
if for all µ ′ ∈M (M,M′) it holds v(M,M′;µ) ≥ v(M,M′;µ ′). The set of optimal
matchings for the assignment market γ is denoted byM ∗γ (M,M′).
With any assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), we associate a game in coali-
tional form (M∪M′,wγ ) (assignment game) with player setM∪M′ and characteristic
function wγ defined as follows: for all S ⊆M and T ⊆M′,
wγ (S∪T ) =max{v(S,T ;µ) | µ ∈M (S,T )} . (2)
Notice that by (1) and (2) we have that wγ ({i}) = pi for all i ∈ M and wγ ({ j}) =
q j for all j ∈ M′. This assignment game, that allows for agents’ reservation values,
is a generalization of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) (that is,
an assignment game with non-negative matrix and null reservation values) and was
introduced by Owen (1992) and also used by Toda (2003, 2005).
We denote by ΓAG the set of all assignment markets γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), and also,
for simplicity of notation, the set of their corresponding assignment games. Since we
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will deal with consistency properties, we allow for the emptiness of one side of the
market.2 The set of assignment games ΓAG is closed by strategic equivalence. In fact,
it can be shown that every assignment game in ΓAG is strategically equivalent to an
assignment game in the sense of Shapley and Shubik.3 As a consequence, Shapley
and Shubik’s results on the core of the assignment game extend to ΓAG.
Given an assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), a payoff vector is z = (u,v) ∈
RM×RM
′ where ui stands for the payoff to buyer i ∈M and v j stands for the payoff
to seller j ∈M′. We write z|S or (u|S∩M,v|S∩M′) to denote the projection of a payoff
vector z to agents in coalition S ⊆ M ∪M′. Also, z(S) = ∑i∈S zi, with z( /0) = 0. An
imputation of γ is a payoff vector (u,v) that is efficient, u(M)+v(M′) =wγ (M∪M′),
and individually rational, ui ≥ pi for all i ∈M and v j ≥ q j for all j ∈M′. We denote
by I(γ) the set of imputations of the assignment market γ .
The core of the assignment market is always non-empty and it is formed by
those efficient payoff vectors (u,v) ∈ RM ×RM′ that satisfy coalitional rationality
for mixed-pair coalitions and one-player coalitions:
C(γ) =
⎧⎨
⎩(u,v) ∈ RM×RM
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑i∈M ui+∑ j∈M′ v j = wγ(M∪M′),
ui+ v j ≥ ai j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′,
ui ≥ pi for all i ∈M, v j ≥ q j for all j ∈M′
⎫⎬
⎭ .
Moreover, if µ is an optimal matching of γ , any core allocation (u,v) ∈ RM ×RM′
satisfies
ui+ v j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈ µ , (3)
ui = pi for all i ∈M \Dom(µ), (4)
v j = q j for all j ∈M′ \ Im(µ). (5)
One single-valued core selection of the assignment market is the nucleolus. This
solution, that was introduced for arbitrary coalitional games by Schmeidler (1969),
only relies on the worth of individual coalitions and mixed-pair coalitions when ap-
plied to the assignment game. Given an assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), with
any imputation (u,v) ∈ I(γ) we associate a vector θ (u,v) whose components are
ai j− ui− v j, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′, pi− ui for all i ∈M and q j− v j for all j ∈M′,
non-increasingly ordered. Then, the nucleolus of the assignment market γ is the im-
putation η(γ) that minimizes θ (u,v) with respect to the lexicographic order over
the set of imputations: θ (η(γ)) ≤Lex θ (u,v) for all (u,v) ∈ I(γ). This means that,
for all (u,v) ∈ I(γ), either θ (η(v)) = θ (u,v) or θ (η(v))1 < θ (u,v)1 or there exists
k ∈ {2, . . . ,mm′+m+m′} such that θ (η(v))i = θ (u,v)i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1 and
θ (η(v))k < θ (u,v)k.
2 If γ is an assignment market with M′ = /0, then it is easy to see that the associated assignment game
(M,wγ ) given by (2) is the modular game generated by the vector of reservation values p ∈ RM, that is,
wγ (S) = ∑i∈S pi, for all S ⊆M. Similarly, if γ = (M,M′ ,A, p,q) with M = /0, then wγ (T ) = ∑ j∈T q j , for
all T ⊆M′.
3 Two games (N,v) and (N,w) are strategically equivalent if there exist α > 0 and d ∈ RN such that
w(S) = αv(S)+∑i∈S di. Let γ = (M,M′ ,A, p,q) be an assignment market where A= (ai j)(i, j)∈M×M′ , p ∈
RM , q ∈ RM′ , and let γ˜ = (M,M′ , A˜) be an assignment market with null reservation values and matrix
A˜= (a˜i j)(i, j)∈M×M′ given by a˜i j :=max{0,ai j − pi− qj}, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′. Then, as the reader can
easily check, wγ (S∪T ) = wγ˜ (S∪T )+∑i∈S pi+∑ j∈T q j , for all S⊆M and T ⊆M′ .
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3 Consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game and the core of the
assigment game
In this section we consider a consistency property, with respect to a certain reduction
of the market, that will be satisfied not only by the core but also by the nucleolus. We
begin by introducing the concept of a solution on the domain of assignment markets.
The next two definitions follow Toda (2005).
Definition 1 Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ ΓAG. A payoff vector (u,v) ∈ RM ×RM′ is
feasible-by-matching if there exists µ ∈M (M,M′) such that
(i) ui = pi for all i ∈M \Dom(µ) , v j = q j for all j ∈M′ \ Im(µ), and
(ii) ui+ v j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈ µ .
In the above definition, the payoff vector (u,v) and the matching µ are said to
be compatible with each other. Notice that a matching that is compatible with a
feasible-by-matching payoff vector need not be an optimal matching. This notion
of feasibility-by-matching, being quite restrictive, emphasizes the bilateral nature of
the market. Note also that any core allocation of the assignment market is trivially
feasible-by-matching, since it is compatible with any optimal matching.
Definition 2 A solution on ΓAG is a correspondence σ that associates a non-empty
subset of feasible-by-matching payoff vectors with each γ ∈ ΓAG.
Note that the core correspondence and the mapping that gives to each player
his/her reservation value (compatible with the empty matching) are examples of so-
lutions on the class of assignment markets.
If γ =(M,M′,A, p,q)∈ΓAG, we write σ(γ) to denote the image of this assignment
market by a given solution σ .
Consistency is a standard property used to analyze the behavior of solutions with
respect to reduction of population. Roughly speaking, a solution is consistent if when-
ever we reduce the game to a subset of agents and the excluded agents are paid ac-
cording to a solution payoff, the projection of this payoff to the remaining agents still
belongs to the solution of the reduced game. Different consistency4 notions depend
on the different definitions for the reduced game, that is, the different ways in which
the remaining agents can reevaluate their coalitional capabilities. Probably, the best
known notion of consistency is based on Davis and Maschler reduced game (Davis
and Maschler, 1965). Peleg (1986) uses the above consistency notion to character-
ize the core on the domain of all coalitional games. However, it turns out that the
Davis and Machler reduced game of an assignment game may not be an assignment
game (see Owen, 1992). To overcome this drawback, Owen introduces the following
reduced market.
Definition 3 Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be an assignment market, /0 ̸= T ⊆M∪M′, and
z = (u,v) ∈ RM ×RM′ . The Owen’s reduced assignment market relative to T at z is
4 For comprehensive surveys on the consistency principles, the reader is referred to Driessen (1991)
and Thomson (2003).
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γT,z =
(T ∩M,T ∩M′,AT , pT,z,qT,z) , where AT = A|(T∩M)×(T∩M′) and
pT,zi = max
{
pi, maxj∈M′\T{ai j− v j}
}
, for all i ∈ T ∩M, (6)
qT,zj = max
{
q j, maxi∈M\T{ai j− ui}
}
, for all j ∈ T ∩M′. (7)
The Owen’s reduced assignment game relative to T at z is the coalitional game asso-
ciated to the Owen’s reduced assignment market γT,z, that is (T,wγT,z).
The interpretation of Owen’s reduced market is as follows. Once agents not in T
have left the market taking their corresponding payoff in z, the agents in T interact
in the submarket defined by the submatrix AT = A|(T∩M)×(T∩M′) but must reevaluate
their reservation values, since the outside option has been modified. Each agent i ∈
T ∩M has the choice of remaining unmatched (thus getting the original reservation
value) or matching somebody, say j, outside T , which leaves an income ai j − z j.
The best of these choices determines the new reservation value of agent i ∈ T ∩M.
Similarly, agents in T ∩M′ reevaluate their reservation value.
Owen’s reduction is closely related to the Davis and Maschler reduction when ap-
plied to an assignment game. Recall at this point the definition of the Davis-Maschler
reduced game (T,wT,yDM) relative to a game (N,w), a coalition T ⊆ N, T ̸= /0, at a
payoff vector y ∈RN by wT,yDM(T ) = w(N)− y(N\T ), wT,yDM( /0) = 0 and
wT,yDM(S) =max{w(S∪R)− y(R) | R⊆ N\T } , for all S ⊆ T , S ̸= T , S ̸= /0.
In the setting of efficient payoff vectors y, the efficiency level in the Davis-Maschler
reduced game relative to a coalition T is exactly the total payoff to that coalition:
wT,yDM(T ) = y(T ).
Owen (1992) proved that for an assignment game γ , Owen’s reduced game at a
core allocation z ∈C(γ) is the superadditive cover of the Davis and Maschler reduced
game at the same core allocation:5
(T,wγT,z) = (T,̂(wγ )T,zDM). (8)
Next we define consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game.
A solution σ on ΓAG satisfies
– consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game if for all γ =(M,M′,A, p,q)∈
ΓAG, all /0 ̸= T ⊆M∪M′ and all z ∈ σ (γ) , it holds z|T ∈ σ
(
γT,z
)
.
5 For properties regarding coalitional games, see Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003). In particular, given a
coalitional game (N,v), the superadditive cover (N, vˆ) is the game with the following characteristic func-
tion: for all S ⊆ N,
vˆ(S) = max
P∈PS
∑
Ti∈P
v(Ti),
wherePS is the set of partitions of S.
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It is quite straightforward to see that the core of the assignment market satisfies
consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game. Take /0 ̸= T ⊆M∪M′. Notice first
that for all z = (u,v) ∈C(γ) we deduce ui ≥ pT,zi for all i ∈M∩T and v j ≥ pT,zj for
all j ∈M′ ∩T , and hence z(S)≥ wγT,z(S) for all S⊆ T . Now, taking this into account
together with (8), we get
z(T )≥ wγT,z(T ) =̂(wγ )T,zDM(T )≥ (wγ )T,zDM(T ) = z(T )
which results in z(T ) = wγT,z(T ).
As for the nucleolus, it is known from Miquel and Nu´n˜ez (2011) that whenever a
game and its superadditive cover have the same efficiency level, they have the same
nucleolus. Hence, taking (8) into account, and also the fact that the nucleolus satis-
fies consistency with respect to Davis and Maschler reduced game on the domain of
balanced games (Potters, 1991), we get that if η = η(wγ ) and /0 ̸= T ⊆M∪M′,
η(wγT,η ) = η((wγ )T,ηDM) = η|T . (9)
This completes the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 1 On the domain of assignment markets ΓAG, the core and the nucleolus
satisfy consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game.
We prove in the next proposition that, on the domain ΓAG, any solution σ satisfy-
ing consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game selects a subset of the core, that
is, σ(γ) ⊆C(γ) for all γ ∈ ΓAG. This result is needed in the axiomatization theorem
(Theorem 1), but it is also of interest on its own.
Proposition 2 On the domain of assignment markets ΓAG, consistency with respect
to Owen’s reduced game implies core selection.
Proof Let σ be a solution on ΓAG satisfying consistency with respect to Owen’s re-
duced game. Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be an assignment market and z= (u,v) ∈ σ(γ).
If M ̸= /0 and M′ = /0, then the only possible matching is µ = /0 and feasibility-by-
matching of the solution implies z = p and C(γ) = {z}. Similarly, if M = /0 and
M′ ̸= /0, then z= q andC(γ) = {z}.
Assume now thatM ̸= /0 andM′ ̸= /0. Consistency (with respect to Owen’s reduced
game) of σ applied to singletons T = {i}, T = { j}, i ∈M, j ∈M′, gives
ui ∈ σ(γ{i},z) whereas ui = p{i},zi =max
{
pi, maxj∈M′{ai j− v j}
}
,
v j ∈ σ(γ{ j},z) whereas v j = q{ j},zj =max
{
q j, maxi∈M {ai j− ui}
}
,
since nobody is matched in one-person assignment games and also by feasibility-by-
matching of solutions. Hence,
ui ≥ pi, v j ≥ q j, and ui+ v j ≥ ai j for all i ∈M, j ∈M′. (10)
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In the remainder, let µ be an optimal matching of γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) and µ ′ a
matching that is compatible with z = (u,v) ∈ σ(γ) (such a matching exists because
of feasibility-by-matching of z ∈ σ(γ)). Using expression (10), it follows
wγ (M∪M′) = ∑
i∈Dom(µ)
aiµ(i) + p(M\Dom(µ))+ q(M′\Im(µ))
≤ ∑
i∈Dom(µ)
[
ui+ vµ(i)
]
+ u(M\Dom(µ))+ v(M′\Im(µ)) = u(M)+ v(M′)
= ∑
i∈Dom(µ ′)
[
ui+ vµ ′(i)
]
+ u(M\Dom(µ ′))+ v(M′\Im(µ ′))
= ∑
i∈Dom(µ ′)
aiµ ′(i) + p(M\Dom(µ ′))+ q(M′\Im(µ ′)),
where the last but one equality is due to a simple reordering of terms and the last one
to the fact that µ ′ is compatible with z = (u,v). Because µ is an optimal matching
of γ , the only inequality must be an equality and hence, the efficiency z(M ∪M′) =
u(M)+ v(M′) = wγ (M∪M′) holds and the proof of z= (u,v) ∈C(γ) is completed.
4 Axiomatic and geometric characterizations of the nucleolus
In this section, we characterize axiomatically the nucleolus on the class of assignment
gameswith agents’ reservation values bymeans of two axioms, the first of them being
consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game. Due to the bilateral structure of
the market, we look for a second axiom that guarantees some balancedness between
groups. As a by-product of the following axiomatization we will derive a geometric
characterization that determines the position of the nucleolus inside the core.
Given an assignment market γ = (M,M′,A, p,q), if j ∈M′ and (u,v) is a payoff
vector, q j−v j measures the difference between player’s j reservation value q j and the
amount v j he has been paid. Thus, the higher this difference is, the more dissatisfied
the agent is with the payoff vector. Sector M′ as a whole can measure its degree of
dissatisfaction by max j∈M′{q j − v j}, and in this way we define the complaint of a
sector as the maximum dissatisfaction of its agents. Analogously, the complaint of
sectorM is maxi∈M{pi− ui}.
A solution σ on ΓAG satisfies
– symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides if for all square market,
γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ ΓAG with |M|= |M′|, and all (u,v) ∈ σ(γ), it holds
max
i∈M
{pi− ui}=maxj∈M′{q j− v j}. (11)
It is worth to remark that symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides,
although defined by means of excesses of individual coalitions, is far from the def-
inition of the nucleolus since it does never compare these excesses across different
imputations.
An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets 9
Note that, when imposed on solution concepts that are core selections, the above
property is not much demanding. Indeed, for those markets with as many buyers as
sellers, imposing symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides results on the
selection of a hypersurface. For instance, in a square Shapley and Shubik’s assign-
ment game (M,M′,A), imposing symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides
is equivalent to imposing mini∈M{ui} = min j∈M′{v j} to the solution outcomes, and
in general there are infinitely many core allocations that satisfy this equality. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the core of a 2× 2-assignment game and the piece-wise linear curve
A−B−C−D formed by the subset of core allocations at which both sectors have the
same complaint.
  A
D
u1
   u2
Fig. 1
A more formal geometric interpretation of symmetry of maximum complaints of the
two sides will follow after the proof of Theorem 1. It is not difficult to realize that
the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core
allocation (point T in the figure), that is known as Thompson’s fair division point
(Thompson 1981), satisfies symmetry of maximum complaint of the two sides. Next
we prove that the nucleolus (denoted by N in Figure 1) also satisfies this symmetry
property.
Proposition 3 On the domain of assignment marketsΓAG, the nucleolus satisfies sym-
metry of maximum complaints of the two sides.
Proof Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ΓAG and let η = η(γ) be the nucleolus of the assign-
ment market γ with |M| = |M′|. Define the two real numbers ε1,ε2 by
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ε1 =−maxi∈M {pi−ηi} and ε2 =−maxj∈M′{q j−η j}. (12)
Notice that ε1≥ 0 and ε2≥ 0 due to core-membership of η . We show ε1= ε2. Assume
without loss of generality that ε2 ≥ ε1. Put δ = ε2−ε1 and construct the payoff vector
z = (u,v) ∈ RM ×RM′ by ui = ηi+ δ2 for all i ∈M and v j = η j− δ2 for all j ∈M′.
Clearly, ui+v j = ηi+η j for all i ∈M and j ∈M′. It is left to the reader to verify that
z ∈C(γ) by checking ui ≥ pi for all i ∈M as well as v j ≥ q j for all j ∈M′.
Notice that ifC(γ) is a singleton, then trivially ε1 = ε2.
IfC(γ) is not a singleton, assume ε2 > ε1. Since for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ it holds
ai j− ui− v j = ai j−ηi−η j,
to lexicographically compare the vector of ordered excesses of z = (u,v) and η , we
only need to consider the excesses of individual coalitions.6
We now write N =M∪M′ and prove maxk∈N{wγ({k})− zk}=− ε1+ε22 . Indeed,
max
i∈M
{pi− ui}=maxi∈M {pi−ηi}−
δ
2 =−ε1−
δ
2 =−
ε1+ ε2
2 ,
as well as
max
j∈M′
{q j− v j}=maxj∈M′{q j−η j}+
δ
2 =−ε2+
δ
2 =−
ε1+ ε2
2 .
From this, together with ε2 > ε1 and (12), it follows that
max
k∈N
{wγ({k})− zk}=−
ε1+ ε2
2 <−ε1 =max{−ε1, −ε2}=maxk∈N {wγ ({k})−ηk}.
Since z ∈C(γ), the latter strict inequality is in contradiction with η to represent the
nucleolus. Hence, ε1 = ε2 and this concludes the proof.
We are now ready to state and prove the axiomatic characterization of the nucle-
olus.
Theorem 1 On the domain of assignment markets ΓAG, the only solution satisfying
consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game and symmetry of maximum com-
plaints of the two sides is the nucleolus.
Proof From Propositions 1 and 3 we know that the nucleolus satisfies both properties.
To show uniqueness assume there exists a solution σ on ΓAG satisfying consistency
with respect to Owen’s reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the
two sides.
Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) ∈ΓAG and z= (u,v)∈ σ(γ). Let η be the nucleolus of the
market γ . We show z= η .
6 The following property is well known (see, for instance, Potters and Tijs, 1992). For any n ∈ N we
define the map θ :Rn −→Rn which arranges the coordinates of a point in Rn in non-increasing order. Take
x,y ∈ Rn such that θ (x) is lexicographically not greater than θ (y). Take now any z ∈ R p and consider the
vectors (x,z),(y,z) ∈ Rn+p. Then, θ (x,z) is lexicographically not greater than θ (y,z).
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Notice first that, from Proposition 2, σ satisfies core selection and thus z ∈C(γ).
Let µ ∈M ∗γ (M,M′) be an optimal matching. If µ = /0, since both z and η belong to
the core, we have z= η . Assume then that µ ̸= /0 and z ̸= η . For any /0 ̸= S⊆M such
that |S|= |µ(S)| let us consider the Owen’s reducedmarket relative to T = S∪µ(S) at
z. Notice that under the current assumptions, such a coalition S always exists. Firstly,
by consistency (with respect to Owen’s reduced game) of σ , it holds z|T ∈ σ(γT,z).
Secondly, since |S| = |µ(S)|, by symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides
applied to σ and the Owen’s reduced assignment market γT,z relative to T at z, we
conclude that
max
i∈S
{pT,zi − zi}= maxj∈µ(S){q
T,z
j − z j}. (13)
Inserting (6) and (7) in the above equality, we obtain
max
i∈S
{
max
{
pi− zi, maxk∈M′\µ(S){aik− zk− zi}
}}
= max
j∈µ(S)
{
max
{
q j− z j, maxk∈M\S{ak j− zk− z j}
}}
.
So far, it holds
max
i∈S,
k∈M′\µ(S)
{pi− zi, aik− zi− zk}= maxj∈µ(S),
k∈M\S
{
q j− z j, ak j− zk− z j
} (14)
for all non-empty coalition S ⊆ M with |S| = |µ(S)| and all z ∈ σ(γ), being σ a
solution satisfying consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game and symmetry
of maximum complaints of the two sides.
Since, by assumption, z differs from the nucleolus η , without loss of generality
we can assume there exists a coalition S∗ ⊆M, S∗ ̸= /0, such that
zi > ηi for all i ∈ S∗ and zk ≤ ηk for all k ∈M\S∗. (15)
Note that all agents in S∗ are matched by the given optimal matching µ . Indeed, if
there existed an agent in S∗ unassigned, i ∈ S∗ \Dom(µ), from z ∈ C(γ) we would
have zi = pi > ηi, in contradiction with the nucleolus being in the core.
Further,
zk ≥ ηk for all k ∈M′\µ(S∗) and z j < η j for all j ∈ µ(S∗). (16)
Indeed, if j ∈ µ(S∗), then j = µ(i) for a unique i ∈ S∗ and the core property yields
zi+ z j = ai j = ηi+η j and so, z j < η j for all j ∈ µ(S∗). Similarly, if k ∈M′\µ(S∗),
either k is not matched by µ and then zk = ηk = qk or k = µ(t) for some t ∈M \ S∗.
In this second case, by (15), zt ≤ ηt , and since both z and η belong to the core, from
zt + zk = ηt +ηk = atk we get zk ≥ ηk.
Recall that (14) is valid for the nucleolus η too since the nucleolus possesses
both properties as shown before. Due to the inequalities (15)–(16) and the equality
(14) applied to S∗ and η respectively, it holds
max
i∈S∗ ,
k∈M′\µ(S∗)
{pi− zi, aik− zi− zk}< maxi∈S∗,
k∈M′\µ(S∗)
{pi−ηi, aik−ηi−ηk} (17)
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= max
j∈µ(S∗),
k∈M\S∗
{q j−η j, ak j−ηk−η j}< maxj∈µ(S∗),
k∈M\S∗
{q j− z j, ak j− zk− z j} . (18)
The chain (17)–(18) of inequalities with at least one strict inequality contradicts (14)
applied to coalition S∗. Hence, z= η .
The axioms in Theorem 1 are clearly independent because the core satisfies con-
sistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game on the class of assignment games but
not symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides and Thompson’s fair division
point satisfies the second axiom but fails to satisfy the first one, since it generally
differs from the nucleolus.
Besides the above axiomatization result, we can provide a geometric character-
ization of the nucleolus for square assignment markets. To this end, some notations
are needed. For all S ⊆M, let the incidence vector eS ∈ RM be defined by (eS)i = 1
for all i ∈ S and (eS)i = 0 for all i ∈M \ S. The vector eT ∈ RM′ , for all T ⊆M′, is
defined analogously.
Now, let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be an assignment market with |M| = |M′|. For each
/0 ̸= S ⊆ M, /0 ̸= T ⊆ M′, |S| = |T |, we define the largest equal amount that can
be transferred from players in S to players in T with respect to the core allocation
(u,v) ∈C(γ), while remaining in the core of γ , by
δ γS,T (u,v) =max{ε ≥ 0 | (u− εeS,v+ εeT ) ∈C(γ)}. (19)
Similarly,
δ γT,S(u,v) =max{ε ≥ 0 | (u+ εeS,v− εeT ) ∈C(γ)}. (20)
We focus on the case in which S and T correspond one another by any optimal match-
ing µ , since whenever µ(S) ̸= T the above critical amounts are null. Notice also
that when a core element (u,v) ∈C(γ) satisfies δ γS,µ(S)(u,v) = δ
γ
µ(S),S(u,v), for some
/0 ̸= S ⊆M, then this point (u,v) bisects a certain core segment.
The following geometric characterization extends the bisection property provided
by Maschler et al. (1979) to characterize the intersection of the kernel7 and the core
of arbitrary coalitional games. In the case of Shapley and Shubik assignment games,
it turns out that the kernel is always included in the core (Driessen, 1998) and a
core element of γ = (M,M′,A) belongs to its kernel if and only if δ γ{i},{µ(i)}(u,v) =
δ γ{µ(i)},{i}(u,v) for all i ∈M assigned by an optimal matching µ of γ .
Next theorem shows that, for square assignment games, if we require this bisec-
tion property to hold not only for all optimally matched pairs but for all optimally
matched coalitions we geometrically characterize the nucleolus. This result general-
izes the one given in Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) for the classical assignment game of
Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Theorem 2 Let γ =(M,M′,A, p,q) be a square assignment market and µ ∈M ∗γ (M,M′).
Then, the nucleolus is the unique core allocation satisfying δ γS,µ(S)(η(γ))= δ
γ
µ(S),S(η(γ)),
for all /0 ̸= S ⊆M with |S|= |µ(S)|.
7 The kernel is a set-solution concept for coalitional games that was introduced by Davis and Maschler
(1965). The kernel always contains the nucleolus.
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Proof Let γ = (M,M′,A, p,q) be a square assignment market, µ ∈M ∗γ (M,M′). If
µ = /0, the nucleolus is the only core point and we are done. If µ ̸= /0, take any
/0 ̸= S ⊆ M with |S| = |µ(S)|. Given (u,v) ∈ C(γ), the vector (u− εeS,v+ εeµ(S))
belongs to the core if ui− ε ≥ pi for all i ∈ S, as well as ui− ε+ v j ≥ ai j for all i ∈ S,
j ∈M′\µ(S). Equivalently,
ε ≤ ui− pi for all i ∈ S and ε ≤ ui+ v j− ai j for all i ∈ S, j ∈M′\µ(S).
Hence, by (19) and (20), the critical numbers δ γS,µ(S)(u,v) and δ
γ
µ(S),S(u,v) equal
δ γS,µ(S)(u,v) =− maxi∈S,
k∈M′\µ(S)
{pi− ui, aik− ui− vk} , (21)
δ γµ(S),S(u,v) =− maxj∈µ(S),
k∈M\S
{
q j− v j, ak j− uk− v j
}
. (22)
By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, the equality δ γS,µ(S)(u,v) =
δ γµ(S),S(u,v) occurs if and only if (u,v) = η(γ), being η(γ) the nucleolus of γ .
Notice from equations (21) and (22) that, when applied to a solution point (u,v)∈
σ(γ) that belongs to the core, the symmetry of maximum complaints of the two
sides, maxi∈M{pi− ui} = max j∈M′{q j− v j}, coincides with the bisection condition
δ γM,M′(u,v) = δ
γ
M′,M(u,v). This means that core elements of square assignment mar-kets satisfying symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides, are at the mid-
point of a certain 45◦-slope range within the core. The above theorem shows that, in
addition to this one, the nucleolus satisfies other bisection conditions.
Figure 2 illustrates the above geometric characterization of the nucleolus.
u1
 u2
N
A
B
C
D
 E
F
Fig. 2
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In light grey we represent the core of a 2×2 assignment game in the plane u1,u2
of the buyers’ payoffs. If we assume that µ = {(1,1),(2,2)} is an optimal matching,
then the nucleolus is the unique core allocation (denoted by N in the picture) that
bisects at the same time the horizontal segment [A,B], the vertical segment [C,D] and
the 45◦-slope segment [E,F]. The higher the dimension of the core, the more the
number of bisection equalities that must be considered.
We finish with two concluding remarks. The above characterization of the nucleo-
lus of square assignment markets applies to arbitrary assignment markets only adding
dummy agents on the short side, that is agents with null reservation values and null
row or column in the assignment matrix. Secondly, this geometric characterization
has been used by Martı´nez de Albe´niz et al. (2013a, 2013b) to provide a procedure
for the computation of the nucleolus of assignment games.
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